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 1 
Japan’s Emerging Trajectory as a ‘Cyber-Power’:  
From Securitization to Militarization  
 
Amongst the multifarious potential sources of instability in the Asia-Pacific, cybersecurity is 
emerging as one of the most prominent and challenging of security agendas—forming an added 
source of contention in the U.S.’s relations with China and North Korea; obliging the U.S. to 
strengthen its cyberdefense and other military capabilities in response; and endangering access to 
yet another aspect of the ‘global commons’ for all states of the region, and for their citizens and 
commerce. On top of uncertainty over the impact of cybersecurity and its relationship to the Asia-
Pacific security environment, questions are inevitably raised over the reaction of Japan to these 
developments, given its increasingly testy security ties with North Korea but especially China, its 
position as a central U.S. diplomatic and military ally in the region, and need as an economic and 
technological great power to safeguard the global commons for its own commercial interests. 
Japan’s response to cybersecurity concerns to date, though, and in line with many appraisals of the 
evolution of its security trajectory in general, has been viewed as more tentative, highly 
circumscribed, and lacking in strategic intent. Japan is not seen as a ‘cyber power’, much in the 
same way that it is often seen to still eschew behaving as and building the capabilities of a ‘normal’ 
or even great military power.1  
                                               
1 Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives, Asia: The 
Cyber Security Battleground (Washington D.C.: Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives, 2013), 
<http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA05/20130723/101186/HHRG-113-FA05-20130723-SD002.pdf>, 2. The 
literature on the extent and nature of change of Japanese security policy is very extensive. For a sample of influential 
views, arguing for essential continuity of Japanese security strategies, see Thomas U. Berger, Cultures of 
Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); 
Jennifer Lind, ‘Pacifism or Passing the Buck? Testing Theories of Japanese Security Policy’, International Security 
29/1 (2004), 92-121; Richard J. Samuels, Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 2007); Andrew L. Oros, Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity, and the Evolution of 
Security Practice (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008); Paul Midford, Rethinking Japanese Public Opinion 
and Security: From Pacifism to Realism? (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011); Adam P. Liff, ‘Japan’s 
Defense Policy: Abe the Evolutionary’, The Washington Quarterly 38/2 (2015), 79-99. For some counter-views 
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The objective of this article, however, is to argue that it is vital to start to look again at Japan’s 
stance on cybersecurity, just as there has been a pressing need and recent attempts to revise our 
understanding of the remilitarization of its security policy and the significance of this for the 
regional security system. Japan’s development as a key player across all dimensions of security 
matters: its choices influence the stability of its relations with China and other regional states. 
Japan’s growing power in the cyber domain undergirds the U.S.-Japan alliance and much of the 
ability of the U.S. to respond to cyber and all forms of security threats, and thus more broadly 
Japan’s actions are increasingly important to the strategic balance in the region. Yet, Japan’s 
activities in cybersecurity have received minimal policy attention, especially in comparison with 
the reams of outputs devoted to the U.S. and China. Sustained scholarly work on Japan and 
cybersecurity in the field of the security studies, whether in English or Japanese, is highly limited 
in number and scope.2 
  
Specifically, this article argues that Japan has initiated a trajectory of assuming the role of a nascent 
‘cyber power’. Now fully cognizant of the nature and security ramifications of potential cyber 
                                               
detecting significant change stirring in Japan’s security, see Christopher W. Hughes, Japan’s Reemergence as a 
“Normal” Military Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Kenneth B. Pyle, Japan Rising: The Resurgence 
of Japanese Power and Purpose (New York: Public Affairs, 2007); Christopher W. Hughes, Japan’s Remilitarization 
(London: Routledge, 2009); and Sebastian Maslow, ‘A Blueprint for a Strong Japan? Abe Shinzō and Japan’s 
Evolving Security System’, Asian Survey 55/4 (2015), 739-765.   
2 For one of the first looks at Japan’s emerging cybersecurity policies, see Paul Kallender, ‘Japan, the Ministry of 
Defense and Cyber-Security’, The RUSI Journal 151/1 (2014), 94-103. For examples of the as yet limited academic 
analysis in English and Japanese, see Yasuhide Yamada, Atsuhiro Yamagishi, and Ben T. Katsumi, ‘Comparative 
Study of the Information Security Policies of Japan and the United States’, Journal of National Security Law & Policy 
4 (2010), <http://jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/14_Yamada.pdf>, 217-232; Tsuchiya Motohiro, 
‘Cybersecurity in East Asia: Japan and the 2009 Attacks on South Korea and the United States’, in Kim Andreasson 
(ed.), Cybersecurity: Public Threats and Responses (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2012), 55-76; Pōru Karendā, 
‘Bōeishō to Saibā Sekyuritī ni Kansuru Shinten to Otoshiana’, SFC Kenkyūjo Nihon Kenkyū Purattofōm, 
Rabowākingu Pēpa Shirīzu, 8, December 2013, <http://jsp.sfc.keio.ac.jp/pdf/wp/jsp-wp_8_Paul%20Kallender.pdf>, 
1-16. 
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threats, at first steadily under previous administrations, and accelerating under current Prime 
Minister Abe Shinzō, Japan is starting to build its own domestic policy infrastructure and 
capabilities for defensive cybersecurity. Through the mechanism of the U.S.-Japan alliance, Japan 
is deliberately and progressively integrating its capabilities and strategy with those of the U.S. in 
order to face down proactively the cyber threats from China and other actors. Moreover, Japan’s 
new seriousness of intent in cybersecurity is reflective of the broader trends of change and new 
assertiveness in it overall security trajectory, and further highly significant due to cybersecurity’s 
deep interconnections with so many other dimensions of military activity. Cybersecurity’s 
facilitation of ‘cross-domain’ operations means it is positioned at the leading edge of and helping 
to drive forward transformation in Japanese policy and capabilities across the full range of land, 
sea, air, and outer space activities. Japan has thus moved to first securitize its response to 
challenges in the domain of cyberspace by taking data assurance issues traditionally within the 
realm of information technology pubic policy governance and now defining and embedding them 
as central security issues and thus to be accorded higher national policy priority and resources, 
requiring a whole of government approach.3 In turn, Japan has begun to militarize its response—
moving elements of cybersecurity from previously purely civilian concerns and now augmenting 
the responsibility of its principal military institutions, namely the Japan Ministry of Defense 
(JMOD) and Japan Self Defense Forces (JSDF)—to deter threats in this domain. 
  
This article—as one of the very first scholarly analyses available on the topic, and accessing 
Japanese materials not yet brought fully into the public domain—demonstrates its arguments about 
the evolution and significance of Japan’s cybersecurity stance in three main sections. The first 
                                               
3 For the classic definition of securitization, see Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New 
Framework for Analysis (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 25. 
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outlines Japanese policy-makers’ increasing recognition of the type of cybersecurity challenges 
posed within the Asia-Pacific region, particularly from China and North Korea. The second 
investigates Japan’s response to cybersecurity threats in recent years in fundamentally 
restructuring and aligning its domestic policy-making doctrines and structures—involving the 
Cabinet Office, National Security Council (NSC), JMOD and other key central ministries, the 
JSDF, the governing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and main opposition Democratic Party of 
Japan (DPJ)—in order to generate more effective cyberdefense policies. It further examines how 
Japan is investing in new cyber capabilities to fend off threats and, possibly, even, in the future to 
enhance its capabilities to take part in offensive cyber operations. The third explores how Japan’s 
increasingly assertive response to cyber threats is being integrated into, and thus amplifies the 
effectiveness of the U.S.-Japan alliance cooperation in this dimension of security. The conclusion 
evaluates the significance of Japan’s evolution towards becoming a ‘cyber power’—a state with 
not only a cyber capability integrated into its national security strategy, but the capabilities of 
which also make it a significant player in the East Asian security architecture, even if not yet on a 
par with the U.S. or China in this domain. It examines the potential impact of Japan’s growing 
presence for the other dimensions of its security policy, its overall security trajectory and 
emergence as a more muscular military power, and the impact on ties with the U.S., China and the 
regional strategic balance. 
 
Japan’s Growing Perceptions of Cybersecurity Challenges 
Japan is becoming serious about cybersecurity, but this was not always the case. In fact, until the 
late 2000s, Japan’s precursor of what is now termed cybersecurity focused on data assurance and 
the promotion of information and communications technology for economic growth; unsurprising 
 5 
given that it possesses the third largest economy in the world by nominal gross domestic product 
(GDP), the fourth largest by purchasing power parity (PPP), and is the second largest developed 
economy.4 Administration of data assurance was devolved to diverse civilian and bureaucratic 
actors, entirely non-militarized, and with a highly limited perception of data assurance as a national 
security issue. The JMOD in its Defense of Japan white papers contained no references to 
cybersecurity until 2010, and only one brief mention of cybersecurity in its 2004 revised National 
Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), the document that set out Japan’s defense doctrine 
alongside the necessary force levels.5  
But from 2009 onwards a series of international and domestic incidents revealed Japan’s 
cybersecurity vulnerabilities and caused it begin to securitize and then militarize its cybersecurity 
strategy. In that year, U.S. and South Korean internet services were subject to large-scale 
distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, and Japan was affected by a sharply increasing 
volume of advanced persistent threats (APT). The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 
(METI) noted waves of attacks specifically against Japan beginning in September 2010, and 
counted a six-fold increase in sophisticated spear phishing attacks on leading corporations, 
research institutes and the government between 2007 and 2011. In 2011, such spear phishing 
attacks accounted for one-third of all recorded attacks, with nearly 37 per cent of APTs focused on 
Japan’s critical infrastructure (CI), for example power plants and high-tech manufacturing 
industry. 6  High-profile breaches followed, including in 2011 attacks on Mitsubishi Heavy 
                                               
4  OECD, ‘Country Statistical Profile: Japan’, OECDi Library (28 February 2013), <http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/economics/country-statistical-profile-japan_20752288-table-jpn>. 
5 Bōeishōhen, Bōei Hakusho 2010 (Tokyo: Zaimushō Insatsukyoku, 2010), 17-18; Bōeishō, ‘Heisei 17nen ikō ni 
Kakawaru Bōeikeikaku no Taikō ni Tsuite’, (10 December 2004), 
<http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2005/taiko.pdf >, 8-9. 
6 METI, ‘Cybersecurity and Economy Study Group Report of August 2011’. A Japanese summary of the report is 
held by the authors.  
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Industries (MHI), Japan’s largest defense contractor, and its computer systems relating to the 
design and manufacture of ballistic missile defense (BMD) interceptor missiles, fighter planes and 
space launch vehicles. Revelations followed of similar attacks on other strategically sensitive arms 
contractors, strategic technology and government corporations and institutions, and not least 
Japan’s main space agency, which is increasingly involved in highly sensitive military space 
development. Japan in 2015 alone was subject to cyberattacks that resulted in the leaking of over 
two million sets of personal data.7 Similarly, the National Police Agency noted a quadrupling of 
the number of cybercrimes reported to it in the year 2014 compared to a decade earlier.8 Table 1 
summarizes notable cyberattacks on Japan since the late 2000s.   
Although North Korea and Russia are mentioned, China is often cited in Japan as the main source 
of APTs seeking to steal strategic information from competitor and leading industrialized nations.9 
The 2013 Defense of Japan white paper devoted a lengthy section to cyberwarfare and APTs, 
noting that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had a cyber unit believed to be carrying out attacks 
on U.S. companies, that Japan’s government agencies had been subject to cyberattacks after the 
acquisition of the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in September 2012, and, by inference pointed 
to China as the perpetrator.10  
 
                                               
7 ‘At least 2 million sets of personal data feared leaked after cyberattacks in 2015’, The Japan Times, 3 January 2016, 
<http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/01/03/national/least-2-million-sets-personal-data-feared-leaked-
cyberattacks-2015/#.VolMYoR8zzI”>. 
8 Jumpei Kawahara, Director for Counter Cyber Attacks, Security Planning Division, Security Bureau, NPA, ‘Cyber 
attacks situation and police measures,” Presentation to the International Cybersecurity Symposium—Critical 
Infrastructure Protection towards 2020’, Tokyo, 29 February 2016. 
9 National Institute for Defense Studies, NIDS China Security Report 2014: Diversification of Roles in the People’s 
Liberation Army and People’s Armed Police (Tokyo: National Institute for Defense Studies, 2014), 52-53. 
10 Japan Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2013 (Tokyo: 2013), 80-81. 
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The result of rising concerns about APTs and China’s potential involvement has been for Japan to 
now begin to elevate cybersecurity into the top echelons of security concerns. JMOD’s Defense of 
Japan since 2011 has carried a substantial section on cyber threats, and placed it alongside weapons 
of mass destruction (WMD) and international terrorism as the most immediate of regional and 
global security concerns.11 The 2010 revision of the NDPG under the DPJ administration, and 
then the 2013 revision under the returning LDP, demonstrated a new cross-party consensus that 
cyberspace formed part of the global commons, along with the land, maritime, air and space 
domains, that required defending and Japan’s objective should be to ensure the ‘stable use of 
cyberspace’.12 Japan’s first ever National Security Strategy (NSS) formulated under the Abe 
administration in December 2013 similarly identified threats in cyberspace as major risks to the 
global commons.13 
 
 
Japan’s Response to Cybersecurity: Strengthening Policy, Institutions, Doctrines and 
Capabilities  
Japan’s moves to emerge as a cyber security power, triggered in reaction to rising perceptions of 
APTs regionally and globally, have taken form firstly over the last fifteen years in the gradual 
securitization of the cyber domain, and then secondly over the last two to three years in the more 
rapid militarization of Japanese cyberdefenses. Japan’s foundational IT policies were initiated by 
                                               
11 Bōeishōhen, Bōei Hakusho 2011 (Tokyo: Zaimushō Insatsukyoku, 2011), 23, 28-32. 
12 Bōeishō, ‘Heisei 23nen ikō ni Kakawaru Bōeikeikaku no Taikō ni Tsuite’ (17 December 2010), 
<http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2011/taikou.pdfpp>, 2, 5; Bōeishō, ‘Heisei 26nen ikō ni 
Kakawaru Bōeikeikaku no Taikō ni Tsuite’ (17 December 2013), 
<http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2014/pdf/20131217.pdf>, p. 2. 
13  Naikaku Kanbō, Kokka Anzen Hoshō ni Tsuite (15 December 2013), 
<http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/131217anzenhoshou/nss-j.pdf>, 7-8. 
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the 2000 Information Technology Basic Law and the establishment in February 2000 of an 
Information Security Section in Prime Minister’s Cabinet Office. The first ‘e-Japan Strategy’ of 
2001 focused on harnessing the revolutionary potential of the digital economy, rather than security 
considerations.14 
Centralization and Securitization of Responses 
A December 2004 review led to the establishment of a Cabinet Office IT Strategic Headquarters, 
and, in 2005, the Information Security Policy Council (ISPC) tasked with devising Japan’s basic 
strategy and a National Information Security Center (NISC) to act as its secretariat to develop 
strategy roadmaps, maintain a government-wide framework for coordinating cyber CI protection, 
and to formulate Japan’s as then limited international engagement on cybersecurity issues.15 The 
IPSC then released Japan’s ‘First National Strategy on Information Security’ in February 2006.16 
But in the hinterland behind these new institutions and emerging strategy, cybersecurity policy 
and administration remained heavily sectionalized. The National Police Agency (NPA) 
prosecuted against cyberattacks that could be categorized as crimes; the JMOD was only 
responsible for its own networks; and intelligence issues were divided between the National 
Security Bureau of the NPA and the Defense Intelligence Headquarters (DIH) of the JMOD, both 
separated from the NISC.17  
 
                                               
14 The IT Basic Law, Article 22 mandates the assurance of security and reliability of advanced information and 
telecommunications networks and the protection of personal information.In the ‘e-Japan Strategy’ of January 2001, 
security is only mentioned twice; once in connection with promoting a shift to the use of IPv64 addressing in a 
discussion of targets, and the other, in passing, notes that security is important as the government should work to 
eliminate the use of paper, see IT Strategy Headquarters, ‘e-Japan Strategy’ (22 January 2001), 
<http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/it/network/0122full_e.html>. 
15 National Information Security Center, ‘Japanese Government Efforts to Address Information Security Issues: 
Focusing on the Cabinet Secretariat’s Efforts’ (November 2007), <http://www.nisc.go.jp/eng/pdf/overview_eng.pdf>. 
16 Information Security Policy Council, The First National Strategy on Information Security: Toward the Realization 
of a Trustworthy Society (2 February 2006), <http://www.nisc.go.jp/eng/pdf/national_strategy_001_eng.pdf>. 
17 Tsuchiya, ‘Cybersecurity in East Asia’, 61. 
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The shocks of 2009, and recognition of the importance of cyber as security domain in itself, 
accelerated Japan’s subsequent reforms. The Second National Strategy on Information Security, 
released in February 2009 and running through to 2011, openly acknowledged the threat of 
APTs.18 Japan divided its cybersecurity structure into three main supervisory bodies: the Cabinet 
Office founded a Crisis Management Center that reported to the Assistant Chief Cabinet 
Secretary; the Cabinet Intelligence Research Office (CIRO) reported to the Director of Cabinet 
Intelligence and on to the Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary; and the NISC controlled the overall 
monitoring of governmental systems.19 Japanese leaders also began for the first time to assert 
political control of cybersecurity policies. The Prime Minister assumed the role of Director-
General of the IT Strategic Headquarters, and the roles of Deputy Director-General were taken by 
the Chief Cabinet Secretary, Minister of State for Science and Technology Policy, Minister for 
Internal Affairs, METI minister, and ten other ministers of state. The Chief Cabinet Secretary 
became the chair of the ISPC, with the Minister of State for Science and Technology Policy as 
deputy. Ministers from the NPA, MIC, METI and JMOD sat as IPSC members. Nevertheless, the 
NISC, while centralizing cybersecurity policy under firmer direct political control, still just 
coordinated rather than exerted control over policy for the NPA, MIC, METI and JMOD.. 
 
The new DPJ administration of September 2009 then overtly securitized policy. In May 2010, the 
ISPC’s three-year Information Security Strategy for Protecting the Nation, for the first time framed 
cyberdefense in terms of national security by asking players to prepare responses to a large-scale 
                                               
18 National Information Security Policy Council, The Second National Strategy on Information Security, Aiming for 
Strong ‘Individual’ and ‘Society’ in IT Age (3 February 2009), 
<http://www.nisc.go.jp/eng/pdf/national_strategy_002_eng.pdf>. 
19 Tsuchiya, ‘Cybersecurity in East Asia’, 61-62. 
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cyberattack.20 In June 2011, Japan enacted a cybercrime law that enabled it to finally join the 
Convention on Cybercrime, instituting a range of penalties regarding the distribution of malware 
or the acquisition or storage of a virus, the right to seize servers, and to request ISPs to store 
communications data. Following an Anonymous hacker collective attack on several Japanese 
central ministries the NISC also set up in June 2012 the Cyber Incident Mobile Assistant Team 
(CYMAT) to provide coordinating emergency partnerships among ministries and agencies.21 
IPSC’s July 2012 Information Security plan focused on APTs and large-scale cyberattacks, and 
suggested setting up attack drills with operators from nuclear plants, the gas distribution network, 
and telecommunications providers. The JMOD, together with the NPA, MIC, and METI, was then 
designated one of the government agencies to coordinate particularly closely with the NISC for CI 
defense, and to bolster international cooperation against cyberattacks.22 
 
The return of the LDP from late 2012, with stable majorities in both the lower and upper houses 
of the National Diet, has provided the platform for the even more rapid bolstering of Japanese 
efforts to centralize cybersecurity policy—the party when in opposition having witnessed with 
growing concern a series of sophisticated APTs in the aftermath of the March 2011 Fukushima 
nuclear power disaster (Table 1). The LDP Policy Research Council’s Special Committee on IT 
Strategy in October 2011 presented sixteen action items, including rethinking information security 
within the framework of national security and diplomacy, and charging the JMOD, NPA and JCG 
with the responsibility to design a comprehensive architecture in their areas of information 
                                               
20 Information Security Policy Council, ‘Information Security Strategy for Protecting the Nation’ (11 May 2010), 
<http://www.nisc.go.jp/eng/pdf/New_Strategy_English.pdf>, 3 
21  ‘Japan Probes Website Attacks Amid Anonymous Claims’, AFP, 27 June 2012, 
<http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2012/06/29/2003536553>. 
22  Information Security Policy Council, ‘Information Security 2012’ (4 July 2012), 
<http://www.nisc.go.jp/eng/pdf/is2012_eng.pdf>, 21-22. 
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security modelled on that of the U.S.23 In February 2012, the LDP’s ‘Proposal on Information 
Security’, designated cybersecurity as a critical part of national security, and matching broader 
ongoing defense reform efforts to transform the JSDF into a ‘dynamic defense force’ (dō-teki 
bōeiryoku) that could counter security threats proactively and beyond Japan’s immediate territory, 
urged that the JMOD, NPA and JCG should strengthen ‘dynamic defense capabilities’ (dō-teki 
bōgyōryokyu) against cyberattacks. The LDP further proposed revising the existing domestic 
emergency legislation for wartime contingencies to include cyberattacks and enact a law to protect 
classified information to make easier cooperation with major partners such as the U.S., UK, 
Australia and India.24  
 
Then, the IPSC, in June 2013, in the wake of the March cyberattacks of the same year against 
South Korea’s finance and media industries, finally replaced the term ‘information security’ with 
the term ‘cybersecurity’ in its new strategy, so recognizing it as a national security issue and a 
strategic domain along with land, sea, air, and outer space. 25  The Cybersecurity Strategy 
contained an entirely new section that for the first time elaborated on the role of the JMOD and 
JSDF in responding to ‘cyberattacks carried out as part of an armed attack by foreign governments 
and other national level cyberattacks for which the involvement of foreign governments is 
suspected’. Accordingly, the JSDF was designated as responsible for countering cyberattacks 
when they constituted part of armed attacks; and the JMOD was mandated to establish a Cyber 
Defense Unit (CDU) under the JSDF.26  
                                               
23 Jiyū Minshutō Seisaku Chōkai IT Senryaku Tokubestu Iinkai, Jōhō Sekyuritī Taisaku ni Kansuru Mōshiire (28 
October 2011), <http://www.jimin.jp/policy/policy_topics/pdf/seisaku-088.pdf>, 1-2. 
24 Jiyū Minshutō, Jōhō Sekyuritī ni Kansuru Teigen (24 February 2012), 
<https://www.jimin.jp/policy/policy_topics/pdf/seisaku-096.pdf>, 4, 16. 
25 Informational Security Policy Council, Cybersecurity Strategy: Towards a World-Leading, Resilient and Vigorous 
Cyberspace (10 June 2013), <http://www.nisc.go.jp/eng/pdf/cybersecuritystrategy-en.pdf>, 4. 
26 Information Security Policy Council, Cybersecurity Strategy, 41-42. 
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The Abe administration then passed in December 2013 the Protection of Specially Designated 
Secrets Law, and then in November 2014 the Cyber Security Basic Act. The former, systematized 
the designation of certain types of information—including JSDF-related operational information, 
signals or imagery data, defense communications networks and cryptography and data on weapons 
and hardware performance used in defense—as national security secrets subject to restrictions and 
penalties for breaches.27 The latter mandated the formulation of a Cybersecurity Strategy that 
would be drawn up based on a Cabinet Decision requested by the prime minister.28  
 
Following recommendations from NISC, in November 2014 the IPSC adopted the ‘Policy to 
Enhance Japan’s Cyber Security’ and transformed into the Cyber Security Strategy Headquarters 
(CSSH), responsible for creating Japan’s new ‘whole of government’ Cyber Security Strategy of 
September 2015. The Cyber Security Basic Act gave CSSH much more comprehensive powers 
to assert a national strategy for cybersecurity—preventing continued stovepiping by making one 
of its prime missions under the law’s first provision ‘3. General Policy’ the assurance of 
cybersecurity at national administrative organs. 29  The CSSH, placed as it is within the 
increasingly powerful Cabinet Office, should now have the authority to formulate common 
security standards for all central ministries and to evaluate their performance, especially in the 
light of any breaches or inadequacies exposed. It also has the authority to monitor expense 
                                               
27 Cabinet Secretariat, ’Overview of the Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets’, 
<http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/tokuteihimitsu/gaiyou_en.pdf>. 
28  NISC, Saiba Sekuritī Kihon Hōan no Gaiyō, 
<http://www.nisc.go.jp/conference/seisaku/dai40/pdf/40shiryou0102.pdfhttp://www.nisc.go.jp/conference/seisaku/d
ai40/pdf/40shiryou0102.pdf>. 
29  Yasu Taniwaki, ‘Cybersecurity Strategy in Japan’, Deputy Director-General NISC (9 October 2014), 
<http://www.nisc.go.jp/security-site/campaign/ajsympo/pdf/keynotelecture.pdf>; and Hiroshi Kawaguchi, 
‘Cybersecurity Strategy in Japan, Japan Security Operation Centre’ (21 January 2015), <http://staff.cs.kyushu-
u.ac.jp/en/event/2015/01/data/17%20kawaguchi.pdf>. 
 13 
budgeting plans for cybersecurity in ministries and IAIs, placing it above competitor agencies 
such as METI and the MIC.30 
 
The 2015 revised Cyber Security Strategy most fully expresses the Abe administration’s 
determination to securitize the cyber domain. Especially mindful of the risks posed to the Tokyo 
2020 Olympics, the strategy stresses that cyberspace is now a key element of Japan’s overall 
national security, and that Japan will look for the stable use of cyberspace in line with the 
administration’s broader security strategy of a ‘proactive contribution to international peace’. The 
JSDF is again charged with defending against cyberattacks through a qualitative and quantitative 
strengthening of its capabilities that encompass the defense of not only its own networks and 
infrastructure, but also to now ‘deepen coordination with stakeholders relevant to the assurance 
of the missions of the Self Defense Forces in light of the possibility that cyberattacks against social 
systems indicated above may become a major impediment to the accomplishment of their 
mission’, so indicating the broader militarization of cyberdefense and its potential stretching into 
formerly exclusive civilian domains across Japanese society.31  
 
The Role of JMOD and JSDF: Starting to Militarize Responses 
The JMOD and JSDF have moved concomitantly to develop a cyber doctrine for domestic defense 
and increasingly international cooperative purposes. The JDA first formally adopted information 
security provisions in December 2000 when it set up its first cyber-surveillance unit in the Japan 
Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF), followed by other units within the Japan Ground Self Defense 
                                               
30 Kawaguchi, ‘Cybersecurity Strategy in Japan’. 
31 Government of Japan, Cybersecurity Strategy (September 4, 2015), <http://www.nisc.go.jp/eng/pdf/cs-strategy-
en.pdf>, 35, 37, 38, 53. 
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(GSDF) and Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF).32 In 2007 the JMOD created a combined 
command—the Defense Information Infrastructure (DII)—to tackle threats, and in March 2008, 
the JMOD and JSDF inaugurated the SDF C4 (Command, Control, Communications and 
Computers) System Command.33 The JMOD’s 2010 Defense of Japan white paper announced the 
policy of ‘Six Pillars of Comprehensive Defense Against Cyber Attacks’, focusing on: improving 
cyberattack defences; intrusion prevention systems; upgrading monitoring and device analysis; 
development of regulations and directives on information assurance; bolstering training through 
the dispatch of personnel to the U.S.; information-sharing with organizations such as NISC; 
increased research on the latest technology for countering cyberattacks; the establishment of a 
coordinator for cyber-planning in the Joint Staff Office; and requesting the DIH conduct long-term 
specialist research into cyber-warfare trends.34  
 
The 2011 Mid-Term Defense Program (MTDP), then called for the JMOD to establish a 
cyberdefense doctrine and to create the forerunner of the Cyber Defense Unit (CDU) later 
established in 2014. 35  Following this, in 2012 the Japanese government for the first time 
acknowledged the status of cyberspace as an operational domain under international law, and 
thereby Japan’s right to self-defense. In January 2012, Kōichiro Gemba became the first serving 
                                               
32 Paul Kallender-Umezu, ‘Japan Takes Action Against Complex Cyber Threats’, Defense News, 9 October 2012, 
http://archive.defensenews.com/article/20121009/C4ISR01/310090010/Japan-Takes-Action-Against-
ComplexCyber-Threats. 
33 For further details on the DII and the Central Command System (a system that performs operations such as intensive 
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teki Shisaku no Suishin Gaiyō: Jōhō Yūetsu no Tame no Kiban Kōchiku o Mezashite’ (December 2000),  
<http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/others/security/it/youkou/index.html>; Bōeishō, ‘Kaisetsu: Jieitai Shiki Tsūshin 
Shisutemutai Kashō no Shinhen’ (2007), 
<http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/2007/2007/html/j22c1000.html>. 
34 Japan Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2010 (Tokyo: Urban Connections, 2010), 184–85. 
35  Japan Ministry of Defense, ‘Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2011–FY2015)’ (17 December 2010), 
<http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/d_policy/pdf/mid_termFY2011-15.pdf>, 4, 6.  
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Japanese foreign minister to attend an ISPC meeting. In April he talked about the relationship 
between cyberattacks and international law, which the media interpreted as a declaration of Japan’s 
right to self-defence against cyberattacks under existing international law, including the UN 
Charter.36  
 
In turn, in July 2012, JMOD’s Defense Posture Review Interim Report, cited response to 
cyberattacks as amongst it ten top priorities, along with items such as strengthening information, 
surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and maritime security capabilities, and promoting the use 
of outer space.37 In September 2012, JMOD’s Toward Stable and Effective Use of Cyberspace 
formulated Japan’s preliminary cyberdefense doctrine. JMOD and the JSFDF were to prepare for 
cyberattacks as part of an armed attack; cyberspace was a domain for defense operations in the 
same way as land, sea, air and space; and responses were on the basis of individual self-defense. 
The document acknowledged the challenges of responding to cyberattacks given the involvement 
of state and non-state actors resulting from the ready availability of information technologies; the 
variety of means available for cyberattacks including malware, DDoS and infiltration of systems; 
that cyberattacks may occur in contingencies ranging from peacetime to wartime; that attacks 
might be characterized by stealth, anonymity and offensive dominance; and that deterrence was 
difficult due to the asymmetric nature of attacks, meaning that it was hard to impose costs on an 
attacker committing cheap and expendable assets, but that deterrence by punishment or denial 
might be involved. The JMOD and JSDF were to strengthen their cyberdefenses specifically by 
                                               
36 Shozo Nakayama, ‘Govt. Claims Cyberdefense Right/Says International Laws Should be Applied to Computer 
Infiltration’, Yomiuri Shimbun, 17 May 2012, 
<http://news.asiaone.com/print/News/AsiaOne%2BNews/Asia/Story/A1Story20120518-346660.html>. 
37 Bōeiryoku no Arikata Kentō no Tame no Iinkai, Bōeiryoku no Arikata Kentō ni Kansuru Chūkan Hōkoku (26 July 
2012), <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2013_chukan/20130726.pdf>, 1, 3, 8. 
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the creation of the DII; establishment of the CDU; improvement of situational awareness and early-
warning capabilities; promotion of cooperation with other government agencies and the private 
sector; and enhanced cooperation with the U.S. and other partners and friendly nations such as 
Australia, the UK, Singapore and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).38  
 
JMOD, following the return of the LDP to government, then requested in December 2012 a budget 
of ¥1.2 billion to establish the CDU with an initial staff of ninety personnel.39 The CDU, reporting 
directly to the defence minister, has taken control of previously stovepiped units. Until this point, 
each service, including the JGSDF System Protect Unit, the JMSDF Communications Security 
Group and the JASDF Computer Security Evaluation Unit, had defended its own systems under 
the coordination of the C4 Systems Command. Under the new system, finally, the CDU and the 
cybersecurity coordinator in the Joint Staff Office took responsibility for the full SDF DII Network 
and Central Command System.40 The revised 2013 NDPG and MTDP stressed the JSDF’s priority 
was to preserve and enhanced joint operations through developing capabilities for persistent ISR 
in cyberspace and for the survivability of command and control systems.41  
 
International Strategy for Cyberspace and U.S.-Japan Alliance Cooperation 
Japanese Cyberspace Diplomacy 
                                               
38  Japan Ministry of Defense, Toward Stable and Effective Use of Cyberspace (September 2012), 
<http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/others/pdf/stable_and_effective_use_cyberspace.pdf>, 3, 5, 7-12. 
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Japanese policy-makers in conjunction with the development of a national cybersecurity strategy 
have also placed increasing importance on international cooperation, recognizing the inherently 
trans-border nature of the challenge of cybersecurity issues demanding multilateral coordination 
and the possibility to acquire policy lessons and advanced capabilities from other states. Moreover, 
as Japan has progressively securitized, and most recently militarized, the cyber domain, the JMOD 
and JSDF have emphasized the importance of working with the U.S. and other international 
partners on cyber for information assurance relating to defense equipment production and broader 
military strategic purposes of securing the global commons.    
Japan’s 2006 First National Strategy on Information Security stated Japan’s ambition to contribute 
to the stable use of cyberspace internationally and even to develop a ‘Japan Model’ that could be 
applied on a global scale to promote cooperation. 42  The 2010 Second National Strategy on 
Information Security reemphasized the importance of international cooperation and partnerships, 
particularly with the U.S. and Europe, and the possibility of Japanese leadership in information 
assurance across Asia.43 The May 2011 Information Security Strategy for Protecting the Nation 
and Information Security 2012 plan stressed the strategic and political strengthening of ‘alliances’ 
for cybersecurity cooperation with the U.S., European Union (EU) countries and the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nation (ASEAN) states. 44  The 2013 Cybersecurity Strategy focused on 
Japan’s role in working multilaterally to ensure the freedom of cyberspace, and cooperation with 
countries that share the basic values of ‘democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law’—
so drawing on the same language of the Abe administration’s broader strategy of values-oriented 
                                               
42 Information Security Policy Council, The First National Strategy on Information Security, 5, 29. 
43 National Information Security Policy Council, The Second National Strategy on Information Security, 68-69. 
44  Information Security Policy Council, Information Security Strategy for Protecting the Nation, 17-18; and 
Information Security Policy Council, Information Security 2012, 92-93.  
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diplomacy, often provided in implicit contradistinction to China’s alleged lack of respect for 
international norms in domains such as cyberspace.45 The 2015 Cybersecurity Strategy again 
stressed that Japan’s cyber efforts were fully part of its larger diplomatic strategy to reinforce 
international rules and norms for governance of the global commons, and that the U.S., European 
and Asia-Pacific were key partners in this campaign, along with now Latin America, the Caribbean, 
Middle East and Africa.46  
Japan’s diplomatic efforts relating to cybersecurity took specific form with MOFA’s creation of a 
Cyber Task Force in February 2012 under the control of Ambassador Shinotsuka Tamotsu, 
consisting of five policy units: international rule-making, cybercrime, system security and 
protection, economic issues, and national cybersecurity.47 In October 2013, ISPC launched a new 
international campaign to assert Japan as an active stakeholder in global cybersecurity. Japan 
committed to international rule-making and capacity-building at the UN, Group of 8 (G8), ASEAN 
Regional Forum (ARF), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and NATO. In respect of policies for CI protection and 
rapid incident response, global initiatives have also been undertaken at the Meridian and the 
IWWN (International Watch and Warning Network), which are for government agencies; as well 
as at such meetings as FIRST (Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams), APCERT (Asia 
Pacific Computer Emergency Response Team) which is a community of CSIRTs from the Asia 
Pacific region, and follow-up meetings to the London Conference on Cyberspace, each of which 
is attended by a broad range of entities from both the public and private sectors. In addition, with 
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respect to investigating cybercrime, efforts are being undertaken to deepen international 
cooperation through frameworks such as the ICPO.48 Japan’s building of relationships in the Asia-
Pacific has been a major priority, given increased investment by Japanese enterprises in ASEAN 
countries.49 
 
U.S.-Japan Military Alliance Extended into the Cyber Domain 
Japan’s diplomatic and technical international campaigns have shadowed and supported the 
efforts by JMOD to begin to militarize the response to cybersecurity through deepening 
cooperation with U.S. military cyber strategy regionally and globally. Japan-U.S. cooperation first 
stressed information assurance for bilateral defense production. As a result of U.S. concerns over 
Japanese data protection in the transfer of BMD technology, the JDA adopted information security 
provisions in December 2000 and set up its first cyber-surveillance unit. Japan and the U.S., via 
the working-level Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) from 2002-2007, and via successive 
Security Consultative Committee (SCC) ‘Two-Plus-Two’ meetings involving the foreign and 
defense ministers of both states from the early 2000s onwards, have focussed increasingly on 
bilateral military integration in BMD, air defense, maritime security, extended deterrence, ISR, 
CI protection, and mutual logistics support—all data-centric operations and necessitating 
enhanced information assurance measures. Japan’s revealed vulnerabilities in 2006-2007 over the 
handling of data relating to the Aegis naval air defense system and the stovepiping between 
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mutually exclusive cyber-defence systems operated by the ASDF, GSDF and MSDF drove further 
change in bilateral data assurance.50 In April 2006, Japan and the U.S. signed the Memorandum 
of Understanding Concerning Cooperation Regarding Information Assurance and Computer 
Network Defense.51 The May 2007 SCC 2+2 meeting committed Japan and the U.S. to sharing 
of BMD and related operational information on a direct, real-time and continuous basis; and in 
August 2007 Japan and the U.S. signed a General Security of Military Information Agreement 
(GSOMIA) to facilitate further confidence in military information exchange.52   
 
Since 2009, bilateral cooperation in cyberspace has further deepened and taken a new direction as 
the U.S. has sought to harness Japan’s support for its global cybersecurity agenda. In turn, Japan 
has increasingly integrated its cyberdefense capabilities into the U.S.’s broader alliance strategy 
to support the U.S. ‘rebalance’ to the Asia-Pacific and to counter the rise of China militarily. The 
U.S.’s stocktaking of its approach to cybersecurity—comprising the May 2009 U.S. Cyberspace 
Policy Review, June 2009 establishment of U.S. Cyber Command, May 2011 International 
Strategy for Cyberspace, and February 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, and more broadly its 
doctrine of the Joint Operating Environment recognizing the crucial importance of data-centric 
operations—sought to incorporate cyberspace as the fifth domain into a combined warfighting 
strategy, involving more centralized control and a cooperation with a range of international 
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partners for collective security ends.53 A new phase was initiated where Japan was expected to 
stretch to follow the U.S. global lead.     
 
The June 2011 SCC meeting for the first time designated cybersecurity, along with outer space, 
as an alliance ‘common strategic objective’ and aimed to strengthen bilateral deterrence and 
contingency responses in cyberspace. 54  The SCC agreed to establish a U.S.-Japan Cyber 
Dialogue, led by MOFA on the Japanese side, which first met in May 2013.55 In April 2012, DPJ 
Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko announced at his summit with President Barack Obama in 
Washington D.C. that Japan along with other alliance initiatives would join the Convention on 
Cybercrime of which the U.S. was already a party.56 The October 2013 SCC classified cyberspace 
as an emerging strategic domain necessitating bilateral cooperation to deal with shared threats and 
enhanced interoperability across a range of alliance military activities. The SCC further signed 
terms of reference for a new JMOD-Department of Defense (DOD) Cyber Defense Policy 
Working Group (CDPWG) to meet biannually to enhance cooperation among their respective 
                                               
53  Executive Office of the President of the U.S., Cyberspace Policy Review: Assuring a Trusted and Resilient 
Information and Communications, May 2009, 
<https://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Cyberspace_Policy_Review_final.pdf>, 20-21; Executive Office of 
the President of the U.S., International Strategy for Cyberspace Prosperity, Security, and Openness in a Networked 
World, May 2011, 
<https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/international_strategy_for_cyberspace.pdf>, 11-15, 18, 
21; Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Report (February 2010), 
<http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/QDR/QDR_as_of_29JAN10_1600.pdf>, 38-39; United 
States Joint Forces Command, The Joint Operating Environment (JOE) 2010 (18 February 2010), 
<http://fas.org/man/eprint/joe2010.pdf>, 34-36. 
54 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan, ‘Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee. Toward a Deeper and 
Broader U.S.-Japan Alliance: Building on Fifty Years of Partnership’ (21 June 2011), 
<http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/pdfs/joint1106_01.pdf>, 6.  
55 The U.S.-Japan Cyber Dialogue involves representatives from Japan’s MOFA, Cabinet Secretariat, NISC, Cabinet 
Intelligence and Research Office, NPA, MIC, METI and JMOD. U.S. Department of State, ‘Joint Statement on U.S.-
Japan Cyber Dialogue’ (10 May 2013), <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/05/209238.htm>. 
56  Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan, ‘Fact Sheet: U.S.-Japan Cooperative Initiatives’ (April 2012), 
<http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/pmv1204/pdfs/Fact_Sheet_en.pdf>. 
 22 
cyber units. The JMOD participants include representatives from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
signalling the importance placed on the meetings.57  
 
The April 2015 SCC and the simultaneous release of the revised U.S.-Japan Guidelines for 
Defense Cooperation demonstrated the growing extent of bilateral ambitions in cyberspace. Japan 
and the U.S. stated their intention to cooperate in cyberspace and outer space to conduct ‘cross-
domain operations’, information sharing on threats, mission assurance, and CI protection.58 The 
revised Defense Guidelines contained an entire section on cyberspace cooperation: 
 
To help ensure the safe and stable use of cyberspace, the two governments will share 
information on threats and vulnerabilities in cyberspace in a timely and routine manner… 
The two governments also will share… information on the development of various 
capabilities in cyberspace, including the exchange of best practices on training and 
education. The two governments will cooperate to protect critical infrastructure and the 
services upon which the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces depend 
to accomplish their missions, including through information-sharing with the private 
sector... The Self Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will:  
 maintain a posture to monitor their respective networks and systems; 
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 share expertise and conduct educational exchanges in cybersecurity; 
 ensure resiliency of their respective networks and systems to achieve mission 
assurance; 
 contribute to whole-of-government efforts to improve cybersecurity; and 
 conduct bilateral exercises to ensure effective cooperation for cybersecurity in all 
situations from peacetime to contingencies. 
 
In the event of cyber incidents against Japan, including those against critical infrastructure 
and services utilized by the Self Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces in 
Japan, Japan will have primary responsibility to respond, and based on close bilateral 
coordination, the United States will provide appropriate support to Japan. The two 
governments also will share relevant information expeditiously and appropriately. In the 
event of serious cyber incidents that affect the security of Japan, including those that take 
place when Japan is under an armed attack, the two governments will consult closely and 
take appropriate cooperative actions to respond.59 
 
The revised Defense Guidelines aim for the close integration of Japanese and U.S. cyberdefense 
strategies and thus form a pivotal component of the Abe administration’s broader attempts to 
develop an increasingly assertive Japanese military stance supporting the U.S. ‘rebalance’. The 
U.S. is now providing a ‘cybersecurity umbrella’ for its ally to accompany the extended deterrent 
‘nuclear umbrella’ and tighter cooperation in outer space, maritime security, and air defense. The 
cybersecurity component of the revised Defense Guidelines, unlike the treatment of the other 
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strategic domains in the document, stopped short of making cybersecurity an explicit element of 
the Abe administration’s intention and then later successful moves in 2015 to breach the ban on 
the exercise of the right of collective self-defense in support of the U.S. and other states. 
Nevertheless, the potential for cyberspace to reinforce U.S.-Japan collective self-defence activities 
is evident. In May 2015, the CDPWG announced that the JMOD and DOD intend to forge options 
“enhanced operational cooperation” between their cyber units.60 Most recently, at the 4th U.S.-
Japan Bilateral Cyber Dialog, held in Washington in July 2016, the partners focused on military-
to-military cyber cooperation.61  
 
The Abe administration’s revised September 2015 Cybersecurity Strategy in arguing that the 
maintenance of the stable usage of the international order around cyberspace is intrinsically linked 
with Japan’s own national security, has essentially repeated the arguments utilized by Abe 
throughout 2014 and 2015 that Japan’s own security is no longer divisible from that of the 
international community, so indicating that the exercise of collective self-defence and 
accompanying security legislation in September 2015 were now justified. Moreover, as pointed 
out above, U.S. policy documents have made clear that cyberspace should be a domain for 
collective security actions with its alliance partners. JMOD and JSDF emerging capabilities also 
readily lend themselves to collective self-defense roles with the U.S. in the same way as their 
extant conventional capabilities. Japan has pledged cooperation with the U.S. in cyberspace in the 
particular areas of information-sharing, detection and early-warning, and CI protection—exactly 
the same type of capabilities that Japan has stated in the revised Defense Guidelines it will provide 
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to the U.S. for collective self-defense contingencies in the maritime and air defense domains. 
Moreover, Japan and the U.S.’s open acknowledgement of the cross-domain nature of 
cyberdefense capabilities, and their indispensable role in safeguarding the information systems 
that enable the coordination and operation of maritime and air defense assets, means that Japan’s 
capabilities are highly likely to be drawn upon any type of military contingency. Japan’s 
cyberdefense capabilities cannot in practice stand outside the collective self-defense framework 
and will form a central plank of bilateral warfighting operations.  
 
Japanese cyberspace capabilities and collective self-defense approach should also be extendable 
to a range of other international partners and ‘quasi-alliances’ (jun-dōmei). In November 2014, 
Abe, Obama and Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott, pledged during the the G20 Leaders’ 
Summit to bolster cybersecurity capacity-building. Japan has also been steadily working with 
Australia, India, the U.K. and France over the exchange of defense technologies, consequent data 
assurance needs, and in some cases plans for more active cooperation on cybersecurity as a 
strategic domain.62 For example, via the bilateral Japan-U.K. Cyber Dialogue, cybersecurity 
cooperation has joined the space and maritime domains as priority areas of cooperation.63 Japan 
conducts a bilateral Japan-India Cyber Dialogue, and in October 2014 there was launched an EU-
Japan Cyber Dialogue.64  
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Conclusion: Japan’s Cybersecurity Policy, Strategic Trajectory, and the Regional Military 
Balance 
Japan since the late 2000s has begun to shake off its reputation as a reactive player in cybersecurity 
and moved to assume the trajectory and role of an emerging ‘cyber power’. Japanese policy-makers 
from all political spectrums and agencies, and provided with added momentum under the current 
Abe administration, have moved cybersecurity to the very core of national security policy, to create 
more centralized institutions for formulating responses on cyber security, and for the JMOD and 
JSDF to build dynamic cyberdefense doctrines and capabilities. Japan’s stance has thus moved 
rapidly toward the securitization and now increasing militarization of responses to challenges in 
the cyber domain. 
Japan’s cybersecurity policies are still under construction and there are challenges aplenty to be 
overcome. The JMOD and JSDF clearly require the steady input of resources to strengthen 
cyberdefense capabilities, eventually needing to recruit and train several hundred personnel to the 
CDU, although the defense budget request for 2016 does contain a substantial request for ¥17.5 
billion for these cyberspace purposes. 65  The JMOD may also need further bolstering of its 
authority to extend cyberdefense activities into the civilian domain for CI protection, probably 
requiring a revision of the Self Defence Forces Law. In addition, Japan’s overall defense posture 
of ‘exclusively defense-oriented defense’ will for the time being remain primarily oriented to 
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deterrence by denial, so contrasting strongly with other cyber powers reserving the right to utilize 
deterrence by punishment.66  
Japan’s cyberdefense capabilities are, though, magnified significantly by their integration with 
those of the U.S. Cybersecurity has moved also to the core of alliance strategy and plans for 
‘seamless interoperability’ of bilateral capabilities, as seen from the 2015 revised Defense 
Guidelines. Japan’s upgraded alliance role helps free up the U.S. to project retaliatory and 
offensive operations in the cyber and other strategic domains, reinforcing U.S. capacity to continue 
to dominate the global commons. The U.S.-Japan alliance’s cybersecurity cooperation therefore 
opens the strong probability that Japan will be at some point in the future drawn into collective 
self-defense in this domain alongside such emerging and acknowledged commitments in maritime 
and air defense operations.   
Japanese efforts in cyberspace, therefore, closely correspond with, and indeed have formed an 
integral driver of, the broader transformation of its security posture and the U.S.-Japan alliance in 
recent years, and especially under the Abe administration. The revised Defense Guidelines have 
removed the previous rigid separation of bilateral cooperation into ‘peacetime’, ‘Japan’ and 
‘regional’ contingencies. The intention is that future military cooperation will operate more 
smoothly across all potential scenarios and levels of conflict escalation. Japanese security policy 
has been incrementally pushing forward, with at certain times more rapid advances, the 
development of JSDF capabilities characterized by an emphasis on joint operations among the 
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MSDF, ASDF and GSDF, greater proactivity in responding to contingencies around Japan’s 
periphery, and the procurement of power projection capabilities.67   
Cyberdefense doctrine and capabilities stand at the forefront of this process of Japanese defense 
policy transformation and impact on Asia-Pacific security. Japan, in line with its ambitions for a 
more proactive defense posture and the expansion of the scope of alliance cooperation, has now 
maneuvered its security responsibilities into the entirely new domain of cyberspace, which by its 
very nature stretches, with no necessary functional or geographical limits, into all other strategic 
domains. Japan with its pervasive capabilities is therefore supporting the U.S. goal for ‘full-
spectrum dominance’ of the global commons as a whole, has moved from a previous purely 
suppoting role into the very frontline of responding to potential conflicts in the region.  
All this is likely to be perceived by China as another means to contain its rise, thereby leading to 
heightened Sino-Japanese tensions along this new strategic frontier, and spilling over into further 
compounding existing tensions in the maritime security and air-defense domains. Japan’s 
expanding defense perimeter in cyberspace is not only likely to provide an arena to bring it into 
further direct tensions with China, but could also prove a ready channel for open and broader 
conflict. If China feels that Japan and the U.S. seek to gain near full superiority in cyberspace, and 
that their cyber capabilities, along with other enhanced capabilities in areas such as space-based 
and maritime ISR, BMD, and signals and electronic intelligence, mean that the PLA can no longer 
evade, hide or strike back at the alliance, then China’s asymmetric warfare doctrine behooves it to 
launch preemptive actions directed at and via Japan’s cyber capabilities with the ultimate aim to 
disrupt JSDF joint operations and support for the U.S. Cyberspace, then, renders redundant the 
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geographical distance and denudes the concomitant strategic buffers that previously moderated 
Sino-Japanese security dilemmas and now presents the possibility of both sides being thrust into 
immediate confrontation. Japan and China will thus need to be cognizant of the risks of rapid 
escalation and conflict in cyberspace and feed through into other forms of military confrontation, 
and carefully manage their interactions in this domain and in the same way as they are searching 
with yet uncertain results for a modus vivendi in the maritime and air-defense spaces, if they are 
not to destabilize bilateral ties and the wider Asia-Pacific region security outlook.  
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